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Faculty and Deans

THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE
OF GESTATION

Lany I. Palmer

The use of

reproductive
technologies

challenges some

Editor's note: This article is from a talk given at the Pew
Science Symposium on Ethics and Science at Union
College, Schenectady, New York, on May l9, 1992.
The views expressed here are those of the aut~ and do
not necessarily reflect the position of the New Yark State
Bar Association's Special Committee on Biotechnology
and the Law, which the author chaired.
The use of reproductive technologies has captured
the public's imagination since the celebrated Baby
M surrogate-parenting case in 1987. The saga of
Marybeth Whitehead-Gould, William and Elizabeth Stem, and Baby M, the child that %iteheadGould agreed to bear for the Stems, has lbeen the
subject of numerous newspaper articles, books, and
television talk shows. It even provided sufficient
drama for a made-for-television movie.
The use of reproductive technologies *ises new
questions about a woman's authority and control
over her fetus and child; and so the dialogue about
the appropriate use of those technologies must take
place within the wider context of. the ethiqal, political, and legal debate about abortton.
At the center of that debate is the! series of
Supreme Court opinions, beginning with Roe v.
Wade in 1973, that have defined our abortion laws.
Those "rights-based" legal decisions have !created a
rhetoric of discussions not only about abdrtion but
also about many other aspects of reproduction.
When thinking about issues related· to surrogate parenting, in vitro fertilization, tihe cryopreservation (freezing) ofhuman embryos, $nd many
other issues, we therefore tend to adopt th~ "rights"
formulation of the abortion debate. We are confused
about whether a woman's right to control her body
includes her right to contract in advance to give
away a child she will bear. We question wnat right a
man who allows a surrogate to use his sperm for
I

ofournwst
fundamental

assumptions
about the

creation and
nurturing of
human life.
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artificial insemination has to legally compel that
woman to give him (and his wife) the child to raise
as their own child. We ask even more disturbing
questions about what rights either a husband or a
wife has to embryos created from their gametes
during the process of in vitro fertilization if that
couple divorces before the embryos are implanted.
Our focus on rights-the rights of women, the
rights of men, the rights of embryos, the rights of
fetuses, the right to privacy, and the right to lifedistracts us from considering the social implications
of the new technologies. And framing ethical questions in terms of rights also masks a deeper debate
about the institution of the family and the obligations that adults have toward children. The use of
reproductive technologies challenges some of our
most fundamental assumptions about the creation
and nurturing of human life.
I want to offer a different perspective for thinking about those technologies and their relation to
the modem family by considering the law's relation
to the dynamics of societal institutions. Our culture
has both public institutions, including medicine,
education, marriage, and law, and private institutions, including family and religion. Law serves two
distinct functions in relation to each type of institution. In general, it functions to regulate public
institutions while it serves to protect private institutions. For example, law regulates marriage, which is
essentially a public act. Because our society recognizes marriage as a desirable goal, we regulate it
minimally.
Private institutions such as the family and religion are protected, rather than regulated, by law. We
believe that children are best raised and socialized
inside a family. Laws are tailored to support the
family unit, primarily by not restricting parental
freedom to decide how to care for and nurture chilJuly 1993 9
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family front state
interference in

childbearing and
child-rearing
decisions. Of
course, there are
limits to that
protection.

dren. The law protects the family from state interfer- party (most often an anonymous donor). The proence in childbearing and child-rearing decisions. Of cess is necessary if the husband is unable to produce
course, there are limits to that protection. For ex- potent sperm and may also be used if the husband
ample, we have numerous regulations about marital has a genetic trait that the couple does not want to
dissolution, because of other concerns about the pass on to their offspring. Its use also created new
family, including the general welfare of children and legal questions about genetic relatedness and parental responsibility. The method was used-signifithe economic welfare of the spouses.
To illustrate my institutionalist approach, I want cantly, in my opinion-without explicit legislation
to discuss the evolution of my ideas about the appro- authorizing such a practice. But like most couples
priate legal responses to the use of assisted-reproduc- who have children, the couples probably assured
tion technologies. First, I will briefly discuss the use themselves that nothing would ever happen that
of artificial insemination. Second, I will look at the would make them or anyone else question the gepractice of in vitro fertilization. And finally, I will netic origins of their children.
focus on the problem of "gestational surrogacy,"
However, some of those marriages ended in
which judges, lawyers, and, most importantly, legis- divorce. During several of the divorce proceedings,
latures, are now trying to resolve. In the only such husbands raised the issue of the lack of genetic
case to come before a court, a California judge connection of the child in attempts to defeat child
determined that a surrogate mother who gestated support obligations. When courts were faced with
and gave birth to a child created from another those attempts by fathers to claim in effect that
couple's sperm and egg, pursuant to a surrogacy genetic connection was the only means of defining
agreement, had no legal rights to the child. Instead, parental obligations, they managed to come up with ,
the judge recognized the ovum and sperm donors as a variety of legal theories to enforce the support '
the sole legal parents of the child.
obligations upon the fathers. After a string of such
I will argue that as a matter of ethics and good cases most states, including New York, passed legispublic policy that focuses on the institution of the lation to settle the matter. A New York domestic
family, the California court decided the case incor- relations law finally passed in 1974 provides:
rectly. I will argue that if we look at the problem from
§73 Legitimacy of Child Born by Artificial
the perspective of citizens and scholars rather than
Insemination
scientists, lawyers, and judges, the woman who ges( 1) Any child born to a married woman by
tates a child must be recognized as a parent of that
means of artificial insemination performed
child. But first let's look at how the law has reckoned
by persons duly authorized to practice mediwith assisted reproduction in the past.
cine and with the consent in writing of the
woman
and her husband, shall be deemed
THELEGALRESPONSETO
the
legitimate,
natural child of the husARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION
band and his wife for all purposes.
Before we assume that there is no conceptual frame(2) The aforesaid written consent shall be exwork in law for dealing with issues associated with
ecuted and acknowledged by both the husthe new assisted-reproduction technologies, we
band
and wife, and the physician who
should remember that humans have been trying to
performs
the technique shall certify that
overcome problems of infertility for a long time.
he
had
rendered
the service.
Adoption is one legal solution. Of course, the difficulties of adoption make it a less-than-attractive
option for many infertile couples. And it is not a
solution for couples who long to have a child who is
genetically related to them.
Artificial insemination was the first "technology" available to help some of these couples. Artificial insemination by donor uses sperm from a third
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There is an ethical argument about the nature
of familial obligations embedded in the statute. It is
important to make the argument explicit before
turning to the practice of in vitro fertilization. In any
disputes that might arise as the result of the use of
reproductive technology, the goal of the law is to
protect the interests of the child in having at least

one, but preferably two, parents who are responsible
for it. The law centers on the obUgatiO'IlS of the adults
rather than on their rights. In fact, the definition of a
child, from the perspective of the law, is simply a
human being, under a certain legally prescribed age,
whose economic, social, and general well-being are
the responsibility of some adult or adults. Thus in
law the primary question is: Who are the adults who
are obligated to act as parents to this particular child?
IN VITRO FERTILIZATION

The law
centers on the
obligations of the

adults rather
than on their

rights.

In vitro fertilization (IVF) is so named because the
fertilization actually takes place in vitro (literally,
"in the glass"), usually in a laboratory test tube or
petri dish. The egg, or ovum, is extracted from a
woman's ovary via a surgical technique. The egg and
sperm are then combined in vitro. In the event of
successful fertilization, the embryo is implanted into
a woman's uterus, with the hope that pregnancy will
result.
The simplest IVF scenario occurs when a
woman's egg is extracted, fertilized with her husband's
sperm, and implanted in her own body. The process
requires no donor material and may be helpful for
some infertile couples. For other couples IVF with
their own genetic material is impossible, and the
sperm or the egg, or both, must originate from a
third-party donor. Donor gametes-genetic material (sperm or eggs) before fertilization-may also be
used for IVF if one or both spouses have a genetic
disease that they do not want to pass on to the next
generation. A third possibility is that a couple may
acquire a donated embryo, which is implanted in the
woman who intends to give birth to and raise the
child.
My ideas about appropriate legal responses to
those techniques have evolved in conjunction with
my work as the chair of the New York State Bar
Association's Special Committee on Biotechnology
and the Law. When faced with the problem of what
laws, if any, should be recommended regarding in
vitro fertilization, afrer much debate the committee
concluded that the approach taken to artificial insemination ought to be used to address in vitro
fertilization. The conclusion was based on the belief
that regardless of the type of assisted reproduction,
the children born should be provided the same legal

protections. We created that protection by recommending that the statute on artificial insemination
be modified to include in vitro fertilization. The
statute would then read as follows:
§73 Legitimacy of Child Born by Artificial
Insemination or In Vitro FertiUzation
( 1) Any child born to a married woman by
means of artificial insemination or in vitro
fertilization [new language in italics] performed by persons duly authorized to practice medicine and with the consent in
writing of the woman and her husband,
shall be deemed the legitimate, natural
child of the husband and his wife for all
purposes.
( 2) The aforesaid written consent shall be executed and acknowledged by both the husband and wife, and the physician who
performs the technique shall certify that
he had rendered the service.
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That legislation could provide some protection
for children born from the use of reproductive technologies and give fair warning, assuming conscientious lawyers, of the legal risks that couples and
individual gamete donors might be taking if they
operate outside the legal framework.
GESTATIONAL SURROGACY AND
IN VITRO FERTILIZATION

The
difficult question
now

is whether

we should

maintain the
connection
between gestation
and legal

nwtherhood.
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The proposed in vitro legislation takes into account
the separation of genetic and gestational maternity,
as in the case of egg donation. But when making its
recommendation, the committee had not contemplated the full impact of gestational surrogate motherhood. Upon reflection, we realized that most of
the time the law had been concerned with establishing male parentage because female parentage was so
clearly established either by giving birth or adopting
the child. We therefore had to go back and look
clearly at the question of who are parents. Thus we
realized that the artificial insemination model was
inadequate for some cases of bifurcated maternity,
which the practices of egg donation, embryo transfer, in vitro fertilization, and gestational surrogacy
make possible.
Specifically, if a woman is unable to gestate a
child, a couple may seek a physician who will create
an embryo from their gametes and then enlist the
aid of another woman, a "gestational surrogate," to
gestate and give birth to the child. This is what
occurred in the California case. Crispina Calvert
was unable to bear children. She and her husband,
Mark, sought out Anna Johnson, who agreed to
serve as a surrogate. Johnson agreed in writing to
give the child over to them for formal adoption, and
the Calverts agreed in writing to pay Johnson's
medical expenses plus $10,000 after she did so.
Unfortunately, as in some agreements, things
did not tum out as the parties expected. Before the
birth of the child, during her seventh month of
pregnancy, Anna Johnson indicated that she was
not sure she wanted to give up the child. The Calverts
filed suit asking the court to decide who were the
rightful parents. As the case has now progressed
through a trial and one appeal, the California courts
have twice decided that Anna Johnson, the woman
who gave birth to the child, is not the legal mother
of the child.

In essence, the court has decided that the genetic connectedness is legally more significant than
the biological process of gestation. However, the
decision ignores the well-established family law concept that gestation and birth are the determinants of
legal maternal status.
In this case, with two women contesting who
should be the child's legal mother, the court determined that Crispina Calvert, the gamete donor, was
the mother, and that Anna Johnson had no legal
rights to custody or visitation of the child she gestated and gave birth to.
The California appellate court seemed to assume that the female and male biological contributions to the birth of a child are equivalent and thus
that the same standards used to determine paternity
may be used to determine maternity. A blood test
showed that Crispina Calvert was genetically related to the child. And the court used that evidence
to then determine that she was the mother. But
neither party had disputed that Mrs. Calvert's gametes were used to form the embryo Johnson gestated. There was no dispute of the facts in the case,
simply a question of the legal significance of those
facts. And in failing to name Johnson as the legal
mother, the appellate court in its reasoning refused
to give legal significance to a biological difference
between men and women-the ability of women to
give birth.
I believe that a woman who gestates a child
must be seen as a legal parent if the law is to give
effect to the social ideal of fairness and equality
between the genders. Current laws recognize that
men and women are different in their contribution
to reproduction. While both men and women are
equal in terms of the genetic contributions, only
women can get pregnant and give birth. For law to
treat men and women equally, it must recognize the
significance of that unique contribution. Indeed,
the difference in reproductive roles is already recognized in the constitutional right of a woman to have
sole decision-making authority to terminate her pregnancy, whether she is married or not.
Pregnancy also creates a unique connection
between a woman and her fetus. We have recognized that connection as the basis of the intimate
bond between the woman and her newborn. And
before the advent of reproductive technologies, we

Current

laws recognize
that men and
women are
different in their

contribution to
reproduction.

always assumed that the woman who gestated a
child was the legal mother. In a sense, the determination of maternity has been established in the acts
of gestation and birth. For instance, for the purposes
of registering a child's birth, the present law and
practice is to ask the woman who gives birth who the
father is. We have thus assumed and in fact structured most of our laws regarding obligations to support children on the premise that a woman who
gestates is the mother.1
Technologies such as in vitro fertilization, egg
donation, and embryo transfer now allow us to contemplate separating the act of gestation from legal
maternal status. The difficult question now is whether
we should maintain the connection between gestation and legal motherhood and adapt our laws to
accommodate the use of the new reproductive technologies. My answer is yes, but the law should be
changed in small increments to leave room for scientists, lawyers, and physicians to grapple with a
host of ethical questions to which the technologies
give rise.
Of course, the legislation that I would recommend does not answer all the ethical questions created by new reproductive technologies. In fact, I
propose only to confirm the legal significance of
gestation, even if doing so would yield a rather messy
result in the Johnson-Calvert case. I believe that the
child in that gestational surrogacy arrangement now
has three legal parents: the Calverts, who donated
the gametes, and Anna Johnson, who bore the child.
A court should consider which parent or parents
should get custody based on what is best for the
child.
Following that reasoning, the bar association
committee reached the conclusion that further
amendments to §73 are necessary.

husband, shall be deemed the legitimate,
natural child of the husband and his wife
for all purposes.
(3) The aforesaid written consent shall be executed and acknowledged by both the husband and wife, and the physician who
performs the technique shall certify that
he had rendered the service. 2
The original statute implicitly takes into account the possible separation of genetic and social
paternity. It recognizes the social union of marriage
and the man's relation to the woman who gives birth
as the legal determinant of paternity. The proposed
amendment, which includes a child born as a result
of in vitro fertilization, also allows for the separation
of genetic and gestational maternity. The proposed
amendment further recognizes that, regardless of the
source of the genetic material, a woman who gives
birth to a child via artificial insemination or in vitro
fertilization is the mother of that child. Thus in a
case of gestational surrogacy, in order for the gamete
donors, usually husband and wife, to achieve their
objective of raising their genetic progeny as their
own child, the gestational woman's status as a legal
parent would have to be extinguished through some
legal process such as adoption.

§ 73 Parents of Child Born by Artificial Insemination or In Vitro Fertilization
( 1) Any child born

to a woman by means of
artificial insemination or in vitro fertilization
shall be deemed the child of that woman.

(2) Arly child born to a married woman by
means of artificial insemination or in vitro
fertilization performed by persons duly authorized to practice medicine and with the
consent in writing of the woman and her

July 1993
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In sum, the recommended statute does not outlaw or prohibit surrogacy but does clarify who has
maternal status in the same way that the existing
statute clarifies paternal status in the case of artificial
insemination. The proposed statute is designed as
the starting point for resolving conflicts about maternity. The modifications would make clear that
regardless of the source of the gametes, a child born
to a particular woman is, in the eyes of the law, the
child of that woman. The modification would cover
the majority of cases, in which genetic and gestational maternity are not separated, as well as the less
common situations of bifurcated maternity (gestational surrogacy or situations in which the woman
who is the intended parent gestates a donated egg or
embryo).
The proposed statute could lead to a disturbing
result in a dispute between a woman who has gestated a child and a man and woman who provided
the gametes for the embryo with the intention of
raising the child as their own. Without any further
legislation a judge could find that the child has three
parents, each of whom would be entitled to be heard
as to questions of custody and visitation. The gestating woman would be the mother of the child by
operation of the statute. Upon giving birth, she
would immediately have custody of the child. The
sperm donor would be the father, because law recognizes genetic contribution for determining male parental status. And, for equity concerns, the female
gamete donor would be given equal status in law to
the male gamete donor. So the gamete donors are
also parents and would be entitled to be heard as to
the child's custody. Although under existing law the
gestating woman is presumed to be entitled to custody, both gamete donors would thus be entitled to
contest that custody or seek visitation rights.
To avoid such contests, the legislature could
pass a law to facilitate surrogacy agreements. Such a
law might include explicit provisions for judicial
supervision of the parties. New Hampshire recently
enacted legislation that creates just such a system of
judicial oversight.3 TheN ew Hampshire law permits
arrangements in which the surrogate is artificially
inseminated with the sperm of the intended father
and also gestational surrogacy arrangements.

The New Hampshire surrogate agreement must
be judicially preauthorized in a county probate court.
Under it, the surrogate mother can choose to exercise her right to keep the child at any time before
seventy-two hours after birth, in which case, parental rights vest solely in her (and her husband). Otherwise the parental rights of the surrogate (and her
husband) terminate seventy-two hours after birth.
So even inside a regulatory scheme to facilitate
surrogate arrangements, gestation still creates an
exclusive claim on legal maternity for the surrogate
if she chooses to keep the child.
Another option is to suggest that the legislature
pass a law to prohibit surrogacy altogether. Under
such a law, surrogate contracts would not be enforceable in court.4 I favor the option, because I
believe that the evidence is now clear that doctors
and lawyers involved in surrogacy arrangements will
continue to encourage couples who desperately want
genetically related children to push the ethical frontiers in ways that could undermine our sense of
obligation to children.
Supporting a statute that would prevent the
enforcement of surrogacy agreements does not require supporting criminal sanctions against those
who engage in surrogacy practices. Some people will
seek to use such agreements, just as they used artificial insemination before legal safeguards were in
place, because it was available and because they had
a strong desire for genetically related offspring. The
wish to be responsible for the next generation is not
something that society should discourage, yet we
must create some constraints by advising the parties
of the risks, including the legal ones, if they choose
to employ a surrogate. Under my recommendation,
by operation of the statute, married couples would
have no legal risks to custody of their children through
their use of in vitro fertilization or artificial insemination. However, when a couple seeks to use anotherwoman's reproductive capacity (as a surrogate),
my legislative solution requires that the parties bear
the consequence of judicial uncertainty as to the
child's custody without explicit legislative standards.
Scientists, physicians, and lawyers should consider
that uncertainty as they develop or advocate the use
of reproductive technologies.

CONCLUSION

Larry I. Palmer is a
professor of law at the
Cornell Law School and
vice president for
academic programs and
campus affairs at Cornell
University.

My general conclusion about the new reproductive
technologies is that we should get away from the
rights-based approach that I believe has its origins in
the abortion debate in this country. As I have tried
to demonstrate, an institutionalist approach focuses
on the social implications of the technologies and
recognizes that the aim is to keep the family secure as
an important social institution, while allowing infertile couples access to those technologies.
If we adopt the institutionalist framework, we
must recognize that family is a private, not a public,
institution, and thus the role of law is limited and
indeterminate. When thinking about the family as
an institution, the primary function of the law is to
delineate the adults' obligations toward children,
not their rights to them. I would remind you that the
legal and ethical problems with in vitro fertilization
and the practice of surrogacy are not new. The
legislative response to the use of artificial insemination is based on a concept of family and obligations
to children. And I believe that that is the proper
foundation for a legislative response to the newer
technologies.
As suggested, law should base legal maternal
status on the act of childbearing. To do otherwise
would be to ignore the unique role that a woman
plays in nurturing a new life. And to eliminate the
presumption that a child born to a woman is that
woman's child would demand that the law inquire
into issues that I believe should remain private.
Again, that is not to say that a woman could not
choose to follow through on a private agreement to
relinquish her maternal status after the child's birth
and allow another woman to become the legal mother

of the child. All I suggest is that it is improper for law
to force her to do so by making enforceable a surrogacy
agreement.
Finally, because law is protecting a private institution, it cannot and should not resolve all the
ethical issues that the new reproductive technologies create. Many of the concerns can only be resolved by individuals with reference to their own
religious or personal values about human life. Rather,
law should make accommodations to the new reproductive technologies in small increments. The ethical debate must continue, for we are sure to have
newer and bolder technologies within reach soon. I
believe that we need to address the advances not just
with reference to the rights of individuals. More
importantly, we must contemplate the impact of the
technologies on the creation of families and on how
adults accept responsibility for the creation and care
of the next generation.
1. Of course, the status of motherhood can be transferred
after birth. Adoption is the clear example of that transfer:
the woman who gives birth is the mother, but she can
relinquish her legal maternal status to allow another
woman to adopt the child and so become its legal mother.

2. The bar association's Special Committee on Biotechnology and the Law is still deliberating on this modification of the statute.
3. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §168-B:1 to B:32 (1990).
4. New Yorkrecentlypassedalaw,effectiveJuly 17,1993,
to prohibit surrogacy. NewYork Domestic Relations Law
§§ 121-24 makes surrogate-parenting contracts void and
unenforceable. But the statute does not make clear what
standing the female gamete donor might have in a failed
(unenforceable) surrogate agreement by virtue of her
genetic relation to the child.
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